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Assikstance
Planning.

Serial
1.
2.

J.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
.t l.

12.
13.

• Table 4: Funding
2002-2003.

Total
Budget

Activity

Duration

Implementing the victim ns~ isrcmcc strnlegy
Pn,,·i<l1 ru! a<IV<)Cac v ror victim~
Treati ng 30 upper-lim b amputees per year , including three sight impaired
victims abroad
Provision of raw materials to the Tirana Orthopedic Centre wtth ICRC
support
Treating 30 lowcr ·limb victims in Albania per year with ICRC support
Training three dot:tors fromrHJTihc.a s tcm Alhauia ill a'h;mccd surg:ical
oroccdurcs (trauma ;md amputations) O\'Cr three yrs
lmorovinu suruical facilities in northeastern A ll~tnia
Training six orthopedic tcclmicians in upper-limb prosthc.scs and
Ot1hothcscs
Tmininu or six ducto"/nnrse' in basic physiothcmpy
Conducting a stu·"cy to detcrm.inc further areas of ccouomic integra ti on of
the families of 2-13 victims
Prtwidi ng micro-fin:mcc to :·1ssis1 with rcin rcgral iun of , ·it:tims, basil:t.tlly
bcc-kecoin• and animal husbandry
Transitional strategy implemented to ensure a sustainable Albanian victim
assistance ca >acit\' is in -place by 2005
Mana•ement
Totnl

2003
2001--.2()()5
2003- 2005

$300,000

2l.XJ.~-2005

$15,000

f-~TIVITY

-

Capadl)' Building
and Coo rdinatiou of
mine- action
(lmplemeuted b.r
UNDP1
Tcrhnlcnl survev
Oemiuing FSO

Demlnlng DCAACT

F UNDING 2002

BUDGET2003

1::--mr: Sl l 9.ooo

~20,000

u

IT!': $27,000
Dl ·m : S125,000
Total : ~271 ,1 ~X l

Ll rn·: :sJJo.uoo
S witLcrlaud : $330.000
( icnnan) I H ~LP:
S300,1XXJ
I ·SD; S70.mO
Total: S I ,030.000
.\ C l' ll<~land: $350,000
IX:.\ -. \ CT: $363.700
Danida: 5297,895
l ·.s .: :>43.500

2003-2005
2001~2005

2003-~

$1.WO

2003-2005
2003- 2005
2003

$ 15,000
$5,000

2<XJ3-200.5

$ 150,000

2003-2005

MOBILISED
DR D $225,000
l Tj\'fJP $90,000

$65.000
$711,000

SHORTFALL
$100,000

(2002)
ITF $S,I MXI (2(K)2)

S2,000,000
:, 1,000,000

$ 1.300,000

Conclusions

b U. Ucrmany and
IT f< S I ,000.000

S I ,000,000 mostly

$300,000

from Ell rmd
marc hing funds

from ITF

O ther: S I S8.900
Tntal : 5 1,261,995
IT F

~IOO,()(lO

S2.'i5,000

MKE

$35.000
T<•tal : $ 13 5 ,000
l ·"ll'LI-: )7 1,000

$\13,000

$ 140,0(Xl. pk><lgcs
from ITF and
ICRC
$30.000

TOTAL

$!,698.000

$5,068,000

$4,490,000

ICI~ C:

Rehabilitatio n Ins titut e with ITF
a ss istance. T wclve victims were assisted by
the IC RC ro set up small enterprises.
Several laws now afford the di sabled
s p ec ial privileges. The Albanian
monthly disability pension was recently
increased. A broad integra ted victim
assistance strategy was adopte d in
Albania. The goal of this strategy is to
build a sustainable Albanian mine action
capability by 2005. Irs objectives are to:
• Fit prostheses to priority lower-limb
ampurees in Albania.
• Fir prostheses t o upp er-limb
amp utees abroad (S love nia).
• R ehabili t a t e sig ht - impai red
victi ms abroad.
• Bui ld the capacity of Albanian
institutions ro fir all types of prostheses
and orthoses in Albania by 2005.
• Build a victim re habilitation
capacity in Albania by 2005.

Previous and current donors include
the UNDP, EU, DFID, ITF, ICRC, and
the Canadian, Danish, German, Swiss,
Turkish and U.S. governments. In June
2002, the EU reached a consensus to fund
mine action in Albania "as far as possible"
through the CARDS programme (Integrated Border Management Project). Of
the $5.068 million budget for 2003, $4.49
million has already been funded, leaving
a shortfall of $0.578 million The roral
budget for rhe ensuing years until 2005
will be around $3.9 million per annum.

Ell plcduc €2 m

l .n\.emhonrg: .$48.000

V ir1 im A ssislluu·,.

Funding

$21 ,000
$30,<Xl0
$92,000
$ 15,000

2003- 2005

fully establish ed by 2005; the MRE
objec tives will mostly have been reached
and a solid resource mobiLisation base will
have been established.

$115,000

$63,000
(UNICEF
pled11.e?)
$578000

• Develop the capacity in north eas tern AI bani a to surgically rrea.r trauma
and amputee victims and serve as a level
th ree medical facility for v ictims of
demining accidents.
•Conduct economic reintegration of
mine victi ms through a micro-financing
scheme.
The main goal of victim assistance
planning from 2003 is ro establish an
Albanian capacity by 2005. (see Table 3).

Transition Strategy
The Albanian government will
assume almost full responsibility of
its mine action programme by the end
of 2005 . After 2005 , there will be a
reduced mine action programme allowing
for a leaner structure wirh only low-impact
areas left to de mine. An Albanian capacity
for demining and victim assistance will be
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There is a significant mine and UXO
threat in northeastern Albania, but there
is also an increased awareness and
co mmitment to solving rhe problem.
The year 2002 was the rurning point
for the Albania mine action programme,
and 2003 will be crucial. Albania can now
ser rhe pace in the region on issues such as
stockpile destruction. The focus this year
will be on accurately determining the
extent of rhe mine and UXO problem
an d initiati ng the transition strategy to
realise rhe strategic objective of making
Albania free from mines and UXO by 2005.1

*All graphics courtesy ofthe author, unless
otherwise noted.

Contact Information
Jab Swart
CTA, Albanian Mine Action
Programme
UNDP Albania
Deshmoret e 4 Shkurrit street, no. 35
T irana, Albania
1el: +355692094627
E-mail: jab.swart@undp. org

In the Name of Humanity
A recent study of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mine action programme
concentrated on the effective use of donations from political, financial and
prod uctivity perspectives. The premise of the study was that similar tasks,
undertaken by a similar work force, with similar training and equipment, in
the same time period, should be achieved with comparable timeframes and
costs. Results and analysis of the BiH programme from the past several
years are discussed below.

by Eddie Banks,
Project Director~ E and I
Introduction
T he continued suffering inflicted by
landm ines and UXO must be eliminated
in the shortest possible t ime period;
indeed, the international community
acknowledges that obligation. T he Ottawa
Treaty, Dayton Peace Agreement and the
London and Bonn Peace Implementation
Conferences all form legal obligations
add ress ing mine action that BiH has
fo rmally agreed to. BiH was the first Balkans
country to destroy its entire stockpile of
AP mines, wi th the exceptio n of a few
mines for tra inin g and research and
development (R&D), allowed within
the terms of the Ottawa Convention.
U nderpi nnin g the obligatio n to
eliminate landmines is the financial support provided by the donor community
tO assist less affluent countries in meeting their legal and moral obligations. By
removing the cause of the landmine
threat quickly, other aspects of humanita ria n ass ista n ce and national
deve lo pment such as repa tri a tion ,
rehabi litation, reco nst ruc tion and
reconciliation, can proceed unimpeded in
areas that were suspected of, or contained
haza rdo u s material. The refo re, th e
esse n rial requirements of speed, safety,
qual ity and effectiveness to address the
legal, moral, ethical, humanitarian and development objectives are unquestionable.
Iris essential that funds allocated for
mine action , both international and
national, are utilised in a balanced manner,
integrating international objectives with
those of th e afflicted nation. Although
saving lives and limbs is of paramount
importance, there is also a requirement

for funds to be allocated to advocacy, test
and evaluation, R&D, information technology and programme management.
Once global and national plans are agreed
upon, it is critical that allocated funds are
utilis ed in the mo s t cost-effective
manner. So why is it that in some cases
more funding is consistently available for
institutional support than for the removal
of the problem? Why is it that in BiH,
comme rci al organisations completed
more tasks, destroyed more mines and
cleared greater areas at dramatically lower
costs per square m ete r than non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? If
we are truly humanitarian, why do
many donors appear uninteres ted in
performance, or in monitoring or improving
the effective utilisation of their funds?
While politicians, institutions and
individ uals talk about the slow progress
of mine clearance and the decades that it
wi ll take, it is rare to hear these same
groups demand more effective utilization
of donations. Globally, we seem more
preoccupied with international objectives
su ch as International Mine Action
Sta ndards (IMAS), lnfomiarionManagement
System for Mine Action (IMSMA), craining
schools and a ran ge of issues that ra rely
con tribu te to nationa l programmes'
arrempts ro rid their cow1try oflancLnines.
Only a few voices have been raised in
protest, claiming that the co ntributions
provided by the international community
could have, if properly directed, cleared a
far greater area than has been achieved.
W hile thi s study addressed a number of
issues to do with background, financial,
political and structural elements of the
BiH programme, and proposed a more
business-like response to mine action, the
main emphasis was on the performance
of the various types of o rganisations. The
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results of the study identified a number
of negative factors, including co nflicting
political objectives, institutional rivalry
and organisational managemenr requiring
donor support that is disproportionate to
its limited output.

Data Collection and
Performance Comparison
Performance
In o rder to undertake a full comparison between various organizations with
differing methodology, structure and
financ ia l s u ppo rt, su ch as En tit y
Arm ies, C ivil Pro tection units, NGOs
and commercial com pan ies, it was
necessary to have detailed information
on a range of fac tors. Some of these
factors are no t fu lly known primarily
beca use a number of in ternat ional institutions and orga ni sa tion s re fu sed
to provide such informati o n, wh ile
stating that t hey operate in a "totally
transparent and accountable manner. " A
numb er of sources confi rm thi s fact,
including recent United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and European
Union (EU) studies and the £ailed attempts
by our study team to obtain information
that should have been in the public
d omain. However, utilising an independent
database (with information from the
national database as its foundation ),
as well as financial data and independent
work collected over a six-year period,
including daily performa nce data for
machines, explosive d etecting dogs
(EDDs) and manual demining; a considerable amount of data was collected
and analysed. In addition, a detailed study
on demining accidents was also used as
part of the data collection and analysis.
Co mparison of the data acknowledged the differences between organizations , and a common ap proach was
adopted in order to create a level-playing
field . The study avoided the complex
iss ue of factoring, and conce ntrated
instead o n aspects that we re similar,
easily measurable and explainable, and
that provided outp uts that could be

analysed. It was also recognized that
commercial companies include all aspects
in their costs, including profit margins,
while NGOs could utilise multiple
donations for rhe same project and might
have equipment donated, and/or replenished, through additional donations,
rhus considerably reducing operational
costs. In addition, because NGOs do nor
make a profit, it could be reasonably
expected that their costs should be
considerably less than those of their
commercial counterparts. The study results
demonstrated that this was nor the case.

the effects of the continuous reference to
this subject by a number of members of
the international community caused
donors to rake independent action that
affected the structural components of
the national programme, delaying and in
many cases denying donations that had
been planned to be utilised in BiH. The
impact of these allegations on the BiH
programme was measurable, immense
and extremely negative. The results of
the allegations can be clearly seen on
the chart.

late 1997, 1998 and early 1999, when
commercial funding was at its highest,
yet the majority of commercial tasks were
started in the worst period for effective
demining. The total of all tasks started
in this five-month period (1996-2002)
was I ,067 while in the most favourable
months, (March and April, Ocrober and
November) only 726 tasks were initiated.
A separate subject is the use of funds
to support institutional requirements
such as schools, IMAS , IMSMA, and the
support of institutions that have been

500

Selection of
Implementing Groups
A number of performance-related
exercises were undertaken rhar highlighted
marked differences berween various types
of organisations, bur also noticeable
similarities berween organisations. The
study team grouped similar organisations
together and classified them as Commercial, NGO (both international and
national), National NGO (NNGO),
Civil Protection and Entity Armies. The
individual groups are self-explanatory,
bur the use of rwo groups for NGOs
should be explained. In late 1998, the
Commission for Deminingsupporred the
establishment of three NNGOs, representing the different ethnic groups in
BiH. They were initially supported by the
U.S. State Deparrmenr through the
International Trust Fund (ITF). They
were established to be non-profit bur
commercially orientated; in other words,
they were expected to be both productive
and cost-effective. Their results proved
conclusively that NGOs can be as efficient,
productive and effective as commercial
organisations, bur at a lower cost per sq
meter, if rhey are properly managed.

Funding
While the funding problems of the
BiH programme (1997 -1999) are well
known, asare the allegations of corruption
against the BiH Commission for
Demining, it is sufficient to note that
even after months of investigation, no
evidence of corrupt action or improper
use ofpower has been produced. However,

o Commercial
• Non Commercial
• NNGO

450

I Figure 1: Analysis of the BiH Programme from March 2003.

The allegations against the BiH
Commission for Demining were first
circulated in early 1999, and the impact
on commercial demining is almost
immediately evident. Ind eed the
commercial tasks, being undenaken
at considerably lower costs than the noncommercial tasks, gradually fell from 312
tasks in 1998 ro 108 in 2002. The noncommercial tasks increased to 177 in
1999 and gradually fell to around 133 in
2002; however, their funding increased
during rhis period. In addi rion, the
Entity Army and Civil Protection elements
with more than 600 deminers, started
work in 1999. With an increase in financial
support and with more than double the
commercial workforce, a considerable
increase in output should have taken
place-not a decrease.
Other factors can also resrricr effectiveness.
For instance, inadequate understanding of
prioririsarion criteria, especially by
procurement and fund managers, results
in the optimum period for work being
missed. This is particularly apparent in

•

66

•

initiated without a cost-benefit assessment.

In BiH in 2003, more finance will likely
be spent supporting these institutional
requirements than on the removal of mines.

Seasonal Performance
Based on the Clearance
Method
By adding the various performance
figures of the programme, season by
season or year by year, an assessment
of improved or decreased performance
was achieved and an average performance
figure obtained. While many noncommercial organisations had machines
and EDDs, the statistical data illustrates
rhar they did little to improve performance.
In a munber ofcases, commercial equipment
was used in an attempt to improve noncommercial performance. In a large
number of cases, this additional cost
failed to produce a significant improvement.
A separate study was also undertaken to
assess the most effective methods from a
rime, effort and cost basis. The results illustrated

Analysis of Data: Methods

rbar the manual and manual/machine
methods were the most costly and rime
consuming, while the manuai/EDD and
rnan uai/EDD/machine methods were,
depending on the vegetation, the most
effective from a cost, rime and effort perspective. While the commercial
organisations and the NNGOs utilised
the most productive methods, the noncommercial organisations tended to prefer
the more rime-consuming and costly
method of manual and mechanical!
manual demining.

Based on previous work on perfOrmance
analysis, a simple comparison addressing
the various methods was conducted to
ascertain the improvements that both
EDDs and machines, used in conjunction with the manual process, provide. If
operational costs are added to the equation, then a firm understanding of what
each task actually costs and rhe cost benefits of using an integrated approach,
where feasible, was obtained. The effective use of any method depends on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the management of rhe selected methods. Sound
management of an integrated system (the
use of more than one method) maintains
a high safety and quality standard while
improving productivity and cost effectiveness. Poor management will certainly
complicate rhe operational control, bur
just as importantly, it will increase the
hazard, rime and effort required; therefore, negatively affecting safety, quality
and cost. EDDs that are nor in operational use still require feeding, husbandry
and training-this simply adds to the
fixed costs without any impact on produ ct ivity. One non-commercial
organisation had EDDs from 1997 bur
has failed to use them effectively. Anumber of orher non-commercial
organisations have used commercial
EDD assets, bur were unable to manually prepare EDD boxes in sufficient
quantity due to the low productivity of
their manual demining process.
Even machines rhar stand idle incur
maintenance costs. In commercial circles,
the large outlay for purchase demands
rhar a certain production level be obtained

Analysis of Data: Effort
Commercial and NNGO organisations
do nor employ staff if there is no work, and
rarely does any contract have more than a
few rasks. Non-commercial organisations
on the other hand, rend to retain their
staff for the complete year. This means
rhat holidays are part of their contractual
obligations. In addition, if there is nor a
seamless work plan (moving reams from
one sire ro rhe next with no downtime)
rhey encounter additional delays with no
ourpur (measured by sq meters cleared).
Most commercial and NNGOs tend to
use an eight-man team, including the
ream leader and medical orderly, increasin g and decreasing the number of
dem iners when necessary. In 1997 and
1998, rhe United Nations had reams of
20 per sire, the UN High Commission
fo r Refugees (UNHCR) had reams of30
and rhe Entity Armies usually had reams
of ten. These numbers were utilised regardless of how effective the respective
demining reams were. A table of the sq
meters cleared, tasks completed and
days to complete the tasks is derailed
in Table I.
Year

Organisation
Type

1996
199<)

Commercial
A vcragc figure
NNGOs

2002

A vcrage fjoure

1997

NGOs

2002

..-\ vcragc figure

199<)

Civil Protection
A vcragc fig w-e
Entity Armies
A \ 'Craoc fi ourc

Total No
Or Tasks

Aveyage
Sq m pe;~
Tusk

Avevage
No.
Tusk Ouys

AvgNo.
Day/task

20,971,472

1,182

17,742

27,805

23.5

2,414,930

82

29,450

3,645

44.5

5,615,870

310

18,116

27,751

89.5

1,697,566

213

7,970

17,197

80.7

4,139,947

236

17,542

40,288

170.7

Total Task
(sq m
cleaued)

2002

2002
19')<)

..1002

ITablel: Number of tasks, task days and average daily performance.
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to offset rhe purchase cost or support the
donor's disbursement. In one instance,
heavy demining equipment, donated in
1997, was unsuitable and rarely in use. Ir
has been described as "52 tons of scrap. "
Another donation, a 37 ton machine,
cleared a mere 274,000 sq meters in a
six-month period (a figure rhar should
have been achieved in less than a month)
and failed to do any other work for more
than a year. Borh machines were donated
to the non-commercial sector, and the cost
of the poor equipment is included as parr
of the intended donation.
In 1998, a set of productivity norms
was established as parr of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Mine Action C e nter
(BHMAC) standards. Although these
norms caused strong debate, they were
originally intended to provide a simplistic
format to illustrate a theoretical assessment.
The production of performance norms was
intended to guide inspectors and monitors,
bur rhe figures ended up being used in a
regulatory manner. The commercial and
NNGO sector's daily performance figures,
which were generally higher than the stared
norm regardless of site conditions, were
now controlled by these figures. The noncommercial organisations rarely reached the
performance norms, so BHMAC's standards
had lirrle effect on their daily performance.
E..1.ch task sire varies in size, vegetation,
soil condition and site difficulty. In addition, there are logistics and administration
problems, which may vary between
organisations. Therefore, each implementing
organisation should assess each sire
separately in order to select the best
method. The productivity norms
stipulated the amount of work for each
method. Unfortunately, rhe norms,
rather than being used as guidelines,
were sometimes impos e d in a n
unnecessarily restrictive manner.

Results of the Analysis of
Data: Mines Destroyed,
Land Cleared and Tasks
Undertaken
Analysis of the mine data (both AP
and AT mines) revealed rhar in a number
of cases mines were not classified by type
bur by the numbers found. The major
hazard was from AP mines, whereas AT

I I

FOCUS

~·· ~--------------&-~~----~~~~~p~~~~~~~~~---------------------------------------------J~-----------------------------------------------Organisation
Costs Per Sq m
Year
T he management of an inregrated
mines were present on o nly 7.6 percent
of all minefields. However, the AP, AT
and mixed minefield classification normally
anributed to minefields is not applicable in
che BiH scenario. A table of achievement
covering organisation , land cleared,
mines destroyed and tasks completed is
detailed below.
T he table illustrates a threat similarity
between th ree of the groups (NNGOs,
NGOs and the C ivil Protection), wh ile
there is a sligh tly increased level of th reat
for the Commercial and Entity Armies.
However, the "Mines Task-Avg" column
shows that the NNGOs averaged 17
mines per task; the commercial, NGOs
and Entity Armies averaged 10-12 mines
per ta sk; and th e Civi l Pro t ec t ion
organisation averaged only fo ur mines per
task; a hazard factor less than a quarter
of tha t of t h e NNGOs. W hi le che
NNGOs may have had th e largest
number of tasks, they also faced the
greater hazard per cask.
If all tas ks are alloca ted o n che
highest prio ri ty basis, then it should be
expected that over a period of time all
organisat ions wo ul d tend to b e
p ro clueing similar figures. However, the
Civil Protection not only had, by fa r, the
smallest task size but also averaged the
smallest number of mines per task. Their
figures equated to around a thi rd of those
of the Entity Armies, NGOs and comYtar

1996
to

2002

1999
tu

21'1:)2

O rga nlsa tion

C ommen.: ia l
19%'7
1998
19'.19
2000
2001
21'1:!2
NNG O s
1999
2000
2001
2(~\2

19%
tu

2001

1999
IO

2002

1998
to

2002

NGOs
19')6,7
19'./M
1999
2000
2001
2002
CivU Protection
1999
2000
200 1
2002
[ntit~ A rmies
199R
1999
2000
2001
2002

Org. Ty pe

Ye.ar

Total Land

C l<ar<d (In sq
m)

Tolal
AP/ATMini'S

Mln.s

T ask-Avg

Mints Per
Sqm

Commercial
\' <'mgc fi)!:urc

20,971.-172

13,601

1182

17,7-a!

12

1,542

19'.!9
2002

NNGOs
,\\crngc figure

2,-11-1,930

1.376

82

29.-150

17

1.755

19'J7
2002

NGO•
A' cragc figure

5,615.870

3 ,200

JIO

18.116

10

1,755

111'./<J
2002
1998
20()2

Chril Protcdion

•\ ,·erarr~,:
Entil~

ri!.!UI'C

1,697,566

950

213

7.970

4

1,787

Armit's
ligw-c

4,139,9-47

2,597

2J6

17,5-12

II

1,594

A\cnt.g~o:

• Figure 2:Threat , land cleared and task table.

mercia! organ isations, and a quarter of
those of the NNGOs. Another interesting
fact was that one commercial company
that operated as both a prime and a subcontractOr destroyed more than 6,800
AP and AT mines; that is more than 3 I
percent of all mines fo und in BiH.

Cost, Threat and Task
Comparisons
T he conclusions on the effective use
of donations are clear. Wh ile a number
of facts were unknown , most of which
concerned manpower and finance, the
results of all the available data proves chat
the commercial/NNGO groups were far
greater "value fo r money" than the noncommercial sector. A comparison of the
number of tasks undertaken a nd the
financial costs illustrates another dramatic
d iffe rence betwee n the comme rcia l/

M a nual
and EDD
(sq m avg day)

M<ch/Man
(sq m ava day)

MKhiMan
a nd EDD
(sq 01 ave da y)

U nk nown
(MethodNK )

4 60
382
343
5 00
3 81
428

1,039
995
1,138

32
473
579
1,002
1,881
1,081

1,670
135
3,270
1, 163
1,152
807

182
889
4 18
419
659
1,:!.31

41 2
8 55
2 t3
6 2.6

1,242
671
501
4 28

1,155
978
!-13

575

213
125
105

16 1
170

lJO

280

299
308

199

29
37
63
127
70

Sq m Pt'r
Task

1?%
2002

M anual
(sq m llVI day)

14 1
S4
63
86

T otnl No of
Tnsl.'§

964
654
608

4-1

""'
102
113
9-1

692
20

.
.

49~

JJJ

.

313
20-1
216
77

172
484

169
33
ISS
194

53
44
99

190
22
22

187
106
67

232

.

22
121
271
IJ6
241

99
94
53

186
190
JZ9

• Figure 3: M et hod s and productivit y year by year.
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NNGOs and the non-commercial sectors.
Based on known costs, the commercial
and NNGOs completed thei r tasks at an
average cost of KM 65,098, while the
non-commercial organisations completed
thei r tasks at an average cost of KM
2 10,526. The comparison of the threat
(based o n AP and AT mines destroyed)
illustrates another dramatic d ifference.
Based on known costs, the number of
mines destroyed by the comercial and
NNGO 's is, on average, one mine at a
cost of KM 5,494 compared to one
mi ne at a cost of KM 23,714 by the
non-commerc ial section.

Increase in Costs, No
Increase in Productivity
During the six years of the BiH
programmem an understanding of the
use of machines and EDDs gradually
evolved. The table below illustrates the
gradual introduction of mechanical
equ ipment and EDD s into th e BiH
programme, initially with commercial
organisations followed by the nonco mm erc ial o rganisatio ns.
It should be noted that the first
mach ine in BiH, the Bofers used by
Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), was used
for only a cou ple of t asks and has
remain ed parked since that rime. Not
a single official mine clearance task has
been cleared using this machine-yet
more than KD 3 million was originally
provided for mechanical clearance
operations. In many cases, rhe machines/
EDDs were first used by non-commercial organ isations, but later a number of
do no rs provi ded the items. However,
machines and EDDs require considerable
capital outlay and to be cost effective, musr
significantly improve productivity.

policy requires experience, knowledge of
the assets and a sound , business-like approach to thei r utilisation. What became
evidenr was that while assets have been
introduced by rhe non-commercial
organisations over a long period of rime,
productivity has nor noticeably increased.
While commercial companies have to
offset capital costs by improved produccivity, donors provide non-commercial
organisations with E DDs and machines
bur do nor demand an increase in productivity and effectiveness. Therefore,
th ere is no ince n t ive for the noncomme rcial o rgan isa t ions to offset
th e cos t. If assets are poorly managed,
rather than having benefits (in terms of
improved safety and/or quality or a
greater ourput) organisations merely have
a greater capital outlay. In effect, donors
who provide additional resources such
as machines an d EDDs , but do nor
deman d an increase in output, simply
con done ineffectiveness.
An analysis of rhe NGO data for
2002 ill ustrated cha t several new
organisations were extremely productive.
Increased production was found to be a
result of the commercial-style management of these organisations. In one case, a
commercial company was also the owner
of the NGO. In a number of other cases,
the non-commercial organisations utilised
commercial companies for management
and/or th e supply of machines or EDDs.
Th is prompts the question of what is
the diffe ren ce, fro m an effectiveness
perspective, between an NGO and a
co mmercial organisation? Both are undertaking mine act ion activities and
both are, therefore, conducting humanitarian work to humanitarian standards.
Any human ita rian activity should also
req uire rhar work be conducted in an
efficient and effective manner-the only
primary difference is that one works for profit
and the other does not. In the case of
organisations that have no experience, no
equipmenr and no manpower, bur srill use
highly productive sub-contractOrs to work
on their behalf, it also raises rhe question
of how they can be awarded accreditation,
successfully pass a technical contract
assessm ent and presumably underbid
othe r more established organisations.

Tyi)e

1996

2002

KM 3.6 or $ 1.8

Comme rcial
Estimated as

Land Cleared (In sq
m)
34,839,785

Total Cost
KM 125, 423,226
($ 62,7 11.6 13)

Total Cost
Land Cleared
Costs Per Sq m
Or&an lsaUon
T ype
KM 75 ,497,299
20,971,472
KM 3.6 o • $ 1.8
Commercial
($ 37,7-'8,6-'9!
2002 Estimated as
KM 6, 785,953
2,414,930
KM 2.81 Or $ 1.40
1999
NNGOs
($ 3,392,977)
2002 Estimated as
5,615,870
KM 15,780,594
KM 2.81 or $ 1.40
19'.r7
NGOs
($ 7,890,297)
2002 l:islimalcdas
KM 4,770,160
1,697,566
C h·ll Protection
KM 2.81 or $ 1.40
1999
($ 2,385,080)
2002 Esti mated as
KM 11,633,251
KM 2.81 or $ 1.40
4,139,947
1999
Entity Armies
($ 5,816,625)
2002 F.~ti maled as
KM 114,467,257
34,839,785
Total Commercial and
($ 57,233,628)
Non-Commercial
. .
• Figure 4: Estimate of cost s based on Commerc1ai/NNGO costs to clear 34.8 m11l1on sq. m eters.
Yeor
1996

What the Mine Clearance
of 34.8 Million Square
Meters of Mine-Affected
Land Could (or Should)
Have Cost
The cost ro the donor or client of
commercial demining in BiH, on a range
of terra ins, site difficulties and various
methods, fell from an average of more than
KM 4.16 ($2.08 U.S.) per sq min 19961997, to an average ofKM 3. 17 ($ 1.58)
in 2002. The average price over the six-year
period was KM 3.60 ($ I .80) per sq m. The
NNGOs, also operating in a variety of terrains and site conditions and using different
methods, achieved a price of around KM
2.81 ($1.41) in 1999; thei r average price
in 2002 was below KM 2.50 ($1 .25). The
average commercial costs fro m 1998 were
under KM 4.0 per sq m. From 200 I to
2002, commercial companies averaged less
than KM 3. 10 per sq m . The results
i11ustrate that, if the commercial companies
had conducted all of the demining, the
total cost fo r clearing 34.8 mi llion sq
meters wou ld have been KM 12 5.5
mil lion ($6 2.7 million) . H owever,
based on comme rcial and NNGO
costs, the actual cost of demining in
BiH could have been as lirtle as KM 114.5
million ($57.25 million), instead ofberween K.M 240 million and K.M 290
million (a figure that includes additional
unrecorded donations that are estimated
to be around KM 50 million). T his
amoLmt (KM 240 million) is for the clearance
casks and does not include the costs for the
structure, mine risk education (MRE) or
for mine victim assistance (MVA).
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A minim um ofKM 160 million (or
as high as KM 210 million) has been used
by the non-commercial groups. In addition ro lowe r costs, the commercial /
NNGO option would have considerably
reduced rhe rime taken to complete the
tasks, a facro r deemed to be just as important, if not more so, than the reduction in costs.

What BiH Demining Could
Have Achieved (Based on
Available Finance and
Known Costs)
If the non-commercial organisations
had utilised the same modus operandi as
commercial organisations and NNGOs,
then the estimated omput for the same
cost co uld have been greatly increased.
The study was able to assess the actual
costs for a number of organisations, and
by so doing estimated how much land
could have been cleared using the estimated funds donated by national authorities. Based on a commerciai/NNGO
output, and using an assessment of their
salary and associated insurance costs (each
group was different) the costs per sq meter
would range from $2.81 to as low as

$2.10.
While rhe figures show a considerable difference between che commercial/
NNGOs and the non-commercial
groups, it should be noted that these figures
do nor include the so-called "missing"
donations or the lower operational costs
of the Civil Protection and Entity Armies.
The facts are that the NNGO
organisations, working for no profit, in a

• Figure 5: Estimate of
possible achievement
(sq m and cost s)
commercial and NGOs.

Year
1996

2002
1999

2002
1997

2002
1996

Organisation
Type
Commercial
Estimated as
NNGOs
Estimated as
NNGOs
Estimated as
Grand Total

Cost Per Sq m

Sq m Cleared

Total Cost

KM 3.6 or $ 1.8

20,971,472

KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40

2,414,930

KM 2.81 or $ 1.40

56,939,501

KM 75,497,299
($ 37,748,650)
KM 6,785,953
($ 3,392,977)
KM 160,000,000
($ 80,000,000)
KM 242,283,252
($ l2J,J .U,626)

80,325,903

2002

• Figure 6: Estimate of
possible achievement
commercial, NNGOs
and non-commercial.

Year
19%

2002
1999

2002
1997

2002
1999

2002
1999

2002

Organisation
TyJ>e
Commercial
A \'cragc Actual
Cost
NNGOs
A ,·crage Actual
C:osl
NGOs
Estimated Cosl
Civil Protection
Estimated Cost
Entit~· Arm ics
Eslimaled C:osl

Cost Per Sq m

Sq

Ill

Cleared

Total Cost

KM 3.6or $ 1.8

20,971,472

KM 75,497,299
($ 37.748,650)

KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40

2,414,930

KM 6,785,953
($ 3,392,977)

KM 2.81 or $ 1.

14,944,750

KM 2.30or $1

10,224,808

KM2.10or$1

44,994,374

KM 160,000,000
($ 80,000.000)

93,550,334

KM 242,283,252
($ 121.141.626)

Grand Total

similar environmem, could potentially
have cleared 57 million more sq meters
for rhe same amount of money, as opposed
to the 11.4 million sq meters that was
achieved-an increase of 45.6 million sq
meters or 400 percent. The estimate of
possible achievement brings together a
combination of factors, and illustrates
that considerably more clearance could
have been achieved had more emphasis
been placed on the effective usc ofdonations.
It should also be emphasised that with
properly priorirised site selection the
possible increase could have been as high
as 25 percent more rhan indicated. In other
words, for a cost of KM 242 million, an
estimated output of 116.9 million sq
meters could have arguably been achieved.

Summary
The study attempted ro revi ew every aspecr of the demining process,
comparing organisation types and their
individua l and collective demining efforr.
It also reviewed a number of ocher aspects
that have an influence on effectiveness,
such as the need for a balanced response
to funding, the importance of timely
donations and the selection of the most
suitable ground conditions. In addition,
an example of the various time, effort,
method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of rime and site selection,

are "not interested" in their donati on
being utili sed more effective ly.
• In BiH, political, institutional and
personal views have had a negati ve
impact on the effective use of donations;
political and international objectives have
delayed the effective creation of a sustainable national capaci ty.
• Donors are supporting more
projects that have little or no effect on
improving productivity, cost effectiveness
or the removal of the cause.
• While annual output has remained
at around 6 to 6.7 million sg meters, the
number of tasks and mines destroyed has
gradually dec reased since 2000; yet,
technical survey and the increased n umber of deminers since 1999 should have
dramatically increased the sq meters
cleared and number of tasks completed.
The lack of a balanced, business-like
approach that addresses safety, quality,
productivity and effectiveness, at international, institutional and organisational
levels, as well as at the national mi ne
action programme level, is obvious. The
lack of char balanced approach, coupled
with the ineffective management of those
responsible for implementing donations
unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of
affected populations. Yet, we still obtain
these donations "In the name of humanicy." If we are truly humanitarian we need
to focus more on removing the threat of
landmines as quickly and as safely as possible so that affected countries can begin
the long process of post-conflict recovery. •

bur also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively
throughout the year, many decisions
about when, where and how to work need
to be made. Realistically, it will not
always be possible to achieve the ideal
effectiveness optimization. The study
proved char at presem, many of the critical elemems for achieving effectiveness
are not even considered. The facts are that:
• Many donations are not mad e
available in rime to achieve th e most
effective results.
• Sire selection, based on the best
conditions to achieve effective demining,
is rarely considered.
• Commerciai!NNGOs completed in order to 11iew the full study, check out
more sq meter!KM ($) rhan the non- www. eandii. com.
commercial with fewer personnel.
• Commercial and NNGOs have *Ail graphics courtesy ofthe author.
completed more tasks/KM ($) than the
non-commercial.
Contact Information
• Commercial and NNGOs have
destroyed more mines/KM ($) chan the Eddie Banks
non-commercial .
Project Direcror
• The average cost per sg meter un- E and I
dertaken by the non-commercial groups E-mail: banks@eandii.com
is at lease five rimes higher than the Websites: www.eandii.com
average cost per sq meter of the comwww.mkdcorp.com
mercial/NNGOs groups.
• The commerciai/NNGOs work
more hours per day and more days per
month than the non-commercial sector.
• Many donors stated that they
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From Kosovo to
Afghanistan, Cluster
Bombs Again
Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one
of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article
gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization lntersos
has been working to help clear up the problem.

by Fernando Termentini,

/ntersos
Background
Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are
well known from the Gulf War to postDayton Bosnia, bur they were completely
forgotten by the Ottawa Treacy, which
didn't recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo
and in Afghanistan, they have proven to
be more dangerous chan APLs.
Cluster bombs are UXO char became
well known in Italy when some fishermen
found them in their nets in the Adriatic
Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose
security was threatened, nobody at rhar
ri me spoke out in Italy about the fi.1ture
danger: hundreds of these UXO would
spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory,
killing and injuring people, mostly children.
In fact, CBUs don't have a self-deactivating
device that disables them if they do not
explode, so they remain as a long-lasting
danger for civilians, and they can explode
with a slight touch or upon removal.
Modern CBU models are BL-7 and
BL-755, made in the United Scares, and
M K-41, made in the United Kingdom.
T hey are the "elder sisters" of the weapons
used in Kuwait and of the KB-1 used by
Serbs and Muslim Bosnian people during
the Balkan Wars.
CBUs differ from APLs in their
appearance, the former being more
colourful and intriguing, so chat they
can trigger people's curiosity. An APL
is basically a defensive ordnance with a

local target, while a CBU is an offensive
ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs
are real unexploded craps with much
more explosive capaci ty than APLs, as
an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while
a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150m.
In fact, CBUs are dropped during
air raids in dispensers with a capacity
of more than 200 bombs each, landing
randomly on the ground. When they
do not explode, they hide in the grass
or under the ground, up to 50 em deep,
so char nobody can really cell where
they are. In principle, APLs should be
mapped, making their identification,
markina0 and clearance easier and allowing
civilians to avoid them. CBU impact
areas, instead, are very wide targets, difficult to identicy and map before systematic
surveys and clearance are carried out.
They can be identified scarring from
their drop point, if known, or by tracing
them on the ground in a sequence.

CBUs in Kosovo
CBU producers claim a dud rate
nor higher chan five percent, bur according
to our field experience, the actual
percentage is much more significant.
At the end of th e war, in fact, the
biggest and most urgent problem of
Kosovo was that of unexploded CBUs.
In rhe spri ng of 2000, CBUs were
spread everywhere on the ground,
hindering the economi c development
and agriculwral activities after the
winter of war.

•

71

•

• The BL-97 (top and bottom)

In those days, we knew exactly where
90 percent of Kosovo's mines were,
because the Serbs handed over the maps
of registered mined areas to the international community. But we didn't know
with the same accuracy where CBUs had
been dropped. In fact, we had little news
on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM)
coordinates of dropping points, which
made it virtually impossible to fix the
accual affected areas and quantifY rhe real
problem.
Immediately, the international
community launched an appeal to quickly

